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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Thies appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdicts finding 
him guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine, two counts of misdemeanor injury 
to child, possession of marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and concealment 
of evidence. On appeal, Thies challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Officer Daniel Vogt responded to Mountain View High School to 
investigate a call that "there was a male and female that were fighting and that 
there were children inside the vehicle that were trying to jump out of the car." 
(Tr.1, p.78, Ls.19-24; p.80, Ls.4-8.} David Biehl, the person who reported this 
behavior, also indicated that the female in the car threw items out the window, 
which struck his car. (See Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.11, L 7.) 
When Officer Vogt arrived on scene, he "noticed the calling party's vehicle 
was parked behind the suspect vehicle and had its flashers on." (Tr., p.79, 
Ls.20-23.) Officer Vogt also saw an individual he identified as Thies, but "didn't 
know where the other people were, if they were still inside the car or on the 
ground on the other side of the car." (Tr., p.80, Ls.8-12.) After several 
commands, Officer Vogt was finally able to detain Thies. (Tr., p.81, Ls.11-23.) 
Other officers arrived on scene to assist in the investigation and to locate the 
1 There are several transcripts included in the record on appeal. All "Tr." 
references in this brief will be to the transcript that includes the suppression 
hearing held on March 9, 2011. 
1 
woman and children that were involved in the reported activity. (Tr., p.81, L.20 -
p.82, L.20; p.84, L.8 - p.85, L.10.) 
Officer Vogt asked Thies if there had been a "domestic dispute" in the car. 
(Tr., p.85, Ls.23-25.) Thies admitted "there had been a verbal argument" 
between him and "his common law spouse," Patricia Price, but denied any 
"physical violence." (Tr., p.86, Ls.2-11.) As part of his investigation, Officer Vogt 
ran a "basic records check and driver's license status check through dispatch" 
and learned that Thies' license was suspended and that Thies had "prior drug 
arrests." (Tr., p.86, Ls.12-15; p.89, Ls.21-23.) Officer Vogt ran the records 
check at 5:52, eight minutes after "the call began." (Tr., p.87, L.17 - p.88, L.14.) 
Officer Vogt testified that dispatch's response to a records check is "immediate" 
but that he might not be able to review the information right away depending on 
other activity that may be occurring. (Tr., p.88, L.15 - p.89, L.B.) In this case, 
Officer Vogt testified "there was a lot of stuff going on, there was a lot of people 
there, [and] there was a lot of people [they] were talking to," and he could not 
"recall what sort of delay there was from when [he] ran the information to when 
[he] received it." (Tr., p.89, Ls.11-16.) 
As Officer Vogt was discussing Thies' license status with him, another 
officer "walked over toward the suspect vehicle" and "was looking through the 
glass to the interior of the vehicle." (Tr., p.91, Ls.5-9.) When Thies noticed the 
other officer, "he stopped mid-sentence" and was "sweating profusely" even 
though it was only "approximately 60 degrees outside." (Tr., p.91, Ls.17-23.) 
Officer Vogt found Thies' response noteworthy because, in his training and 
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experience, Thies' change in behavior upon noticing the officer looking in his car 
was "an indicator that there might be something there that [he did not] want to 
have discovered." (Tr., p.92, L.15 - p.93, L.5.) Consequently, Officer Vogt 
asked Thies if there was "anything illegal inside the car," and Thies "said there 
was not." (Tr., p.93, Ls.8-11.) Officer Vogt also asked Thies for consent to 
search his vehicle, which Thies declined to give. (Tr., p.93, Ls.15-18.) Officer 
Vogt then "requested a narcotics detection canine" and "began preparing the 
citation for driving without privileges." (Tr., p.93, L.19 - p.94, L.3.) "[A]t that time 
the other officers who were there were still talking with the calling party and 
Patricia Price." (Tr., p.94, Ls.3-5.) 
The officer handling the narcotics dog arrived on scene at 6:12, while 
Officer Vogt was still working on Thies' citation. (Tr., p. 94, Ls.15-17; p.95, Ls.15-
18; p.104, Ls.1-5.) Within a minute of the dog's arrival, it sniffed the exterior of 
Thies' car and alerted on Price's purse, which contained marijuana and a 
methamphetamine pipe. (Tr., p.95, Ls.19-23; p.96, Ls.5-18; p.98, Ls.8-13.) 
Shortly thereafter, Officer Vogt also learned that there was a small metal 
container on the ground by the open door to the back seat of his patrol car where 
Thies was seated. (Tr., p.104, Ls.9-24.) Officer Vogt opened the container and 
found a "green leafy plant material that was consistent with marijuana" and a 
"partially smoked marijuana joint." (Tr., p.105, L.18 - p.106, L.2.) A further 
search of Thies' car uncovered a Crown Royal whiskey bag that contained 16 
baggies of a "white substance ... that looked consistent with methamphetamine" 
and a metal container "that had an additional three baggies of suspected 
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methamphetamine." (Tr., p.108, Ls.11-21.) A subsequent NIK test revealed the 
substance was "presumptive positive for methamphetamine." (Tr., p.109, Ls.1-
3.) 
The state charged Thies with trafficking in methamphetamine, two counts 
of felony injury to child, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and concealment of evidence. (R., pp.36-38.) 
Thies filed a motion to suppress, contending the search of his car was conducted 
during an "unconstitutional expansion of the traffic stop." (R., pp.71, 79.) The 
district court denied Thies' motion, finding: "The investigation in this case was 
multi-faceted and was not complete prior to the drug dog's application to the car." 
(R., pp.125-26.) 
Thies proceeded to trial after which a jury found him guilty of trafficking in 
methamphetamine, two counts of misdemeanor injury to a child, possession of 
marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and concealment of evidence. (R., 
pp.173-78.) The court imposed a unified fifteen-year sentence on the trafficking 
charge and concurrent 90-day jail sentences on the remaining charges. (R., 
pp.218-22.) Thies timely appealed. (R., pp.228-31.) 
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ISSUE 
Thies states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Thies' Motion to Suppress 
because Officer Vogt unconstitutionally extended the investigatory 
detention longer than necessary to effectuate the seizure, without 
his consent, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Thies failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
Thies Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A Introduction 
Thies challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, contending as he 
did below that law enforcement unlawfully prolonged his detention to facilitate a 
drug dog sniff of his car. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-12.) Thies' argument fails. A 
review of the applicable law, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, 
and the district court's factual findings and conclusions of law supports the district 
court's determination that "[t]he investigation in this case was multi-faceted and 
was not complete prior to the drug dog's application to the car." (R., pp.125-26.) 
The district court correctly denied Thies' motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any 
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
That The Original Purpose For Thies' Detention Was Not "Complete" 
Before The Drug Dog Was Deployed 
It is well-settled that the stop of a vehicle constitutes an investigative 
detention subject to Fourth Amendment requirements and is "analyzed under the 
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968)." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citations omitted). It is also well-settled that law enforcement may deploy 
a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle without suspicion of 
drug activity so long as doing so does not prolong the detention beyond what is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405 (2005); State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183-84, 125 P.3d 536, 539-40 
(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P .3d 301, 307 (Ct. 
App. 2000). "There is no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has 
lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the 
detention and the law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the 
duration of the stop." Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198 P .3d at 134 ( citations 
omitted). The court must also consider whether the officer's observations during 
the encounter "and events succeeding the stop" gave rise to "legitimate reasons 
for particularized lines of inquiry and further investigation" which justified 
expanding the investigation to other possible crimes. kl; see also State v. 
Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
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Thies does not challenge the legality of his initial detention; rather, he 
contends that the "Officer Vogt improperly extended the permissible length of his 
investigatory detention ... by taking 25 minutes to investigate the alleged 
criminal offenses by [him] and Ms. Price and taking approximately 13 minutes to 
fill out a simple citation in anticipation of a requested canine unit." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.7) Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence presented at 
the suppression hearing shows Thies' argument fails. 
Thies' first argument appears to be premised on the assertion that taking 
13 minutes to "complete a simple driving without privileges citation" is itself a 
sufficient basis for finding an unlawful extension of his detention, at least when 
the officer "admit[s] he could probably complete [it] in four to five minutes." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) This argument fails to take into account any of the 
circumstances of this case and it is does not accurately reflect Officer Vogt's 
testimony regarding the time it takes to complete a citation. 
Thies was not initially detained for driving without privileges, he was 
detained based on a report that he was seen fighting with a woman in his car 
with "children inside the vehicle that were trying to jump out" and because the 
woman in the car had thrown items out the window that struck the reporting 
party's car. (Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.11, L.7; p.78, Ls.19-24; p.80, Ls.4-8.) Officer 
Vogt specifically testified, and the district court found, that the purpose of the 
initial stop was still being investigated when the canine unit arrived. (Tr., p.93, 
L.19-p.94, L.5; p.103, L.24-p.104, L.5; p.111, L.7-p.112, L.14; pp.155-162.) 
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Thus, the length of time Officer Vogt took to actually complete the citation for 
driving without privileges is ultimately irrelevant. 
Even if Officer Vogt's citation-writing time is relevant, contrary to Thies' 
claim on appeal, Officer Vogt did not "admit[ ] he could probably complete [the 
citation] in four to five minutes." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) When asked what the 
"soonest" he "ever g[ot] done with a DWP citation." Officer Vogt answered, "[t]he 
soonest, it would probably take me four or five minutes." (Tr., p.128, Ls.4-7.) He 
did not, however, "admit" he could have written Thies' citation in that timeframe. 
In fact, Officer Vogt testified that, in this case, "there was a lot of stuff going on" 
and although he could not specifically remember whether he was interrupted 
while preparing the citation, he "kn[e]w that [they] were still communicating with 
each other trying to determine what happened." (Tr., p.89, Ls.11-12; p.95, Ls.4-
7.) Thies' claim that his detention was unlawfully prolonged simply because it 
took Officer Vogt 13 minutes to write a citation fails. 
Thies next argues that "the district court's finding that the officers' 
investigation of Mr. Theis for domestic violence and Ms. Price for malicious injury 
to property was not yet completed by the time the canine alerted on the vehicle 
was clearly erroneous." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) In support of this argument, 
Thies notes that "very soon" after law enforcement arrived on scene, he told 
them the disagreement "had only been verbal, not physical." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.11.) Thies also notes that Officer Vogt acknowledged that he did not view 
"any marks or physical injuries upon Ms. Price," that Price denied any physical 
altercation, and that "collectively, the officers had learned that there was no 
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physical altercation in the vehicle." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) In a similar vein, 
Thies also argues that "just as the officer's concerns regarding the domestic 
incident had been dispelled early on, the investigation of a potential malicious 
injury to property allegation was concluded" after Price told the officer that "she 
did in fact throw items out of the window of the vehicle, which struck Mr. Biehl's 
vehicle." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) None of these arguments demonstrates a 
clearly erroneous factual finding by the district court. 
Law enforcement was not required to stop investigating the reported 
incident simply because Thies and Price denied any physical altercation and 
because Price admitted she threw items out the window. As explained by Officer 
Vogt: 
Even though I had been told by Mr. Thies that it was verbal only, 
we had the calling party who saw certain things. And we have the 
female who was inside the car that needed to be spoken with about 
the incident. In addition to that there's two children who were 
witnesses. There were things that were being thrown around inside 
the car. We had reports of the children jumping out of the vehicle 
at an intersection. 
And in addition to that, there was damage to the calling 
party's vehicle. So we were trying to determine if the damage was 
malicious in nature because there was an item that was thrown out 
of the vehicle that hit the calling party's vehicle that either damaged 
the vehicle and we were trying to determine is this a littering case 
or is this a malicious injury to property case. So there were all of 
those dynamics that were -- the two children were inside the school 
apparently at driver's education training and were engaged in all of 
that. 
(Tr., p.111, L.16 - p.112, L.11.) The district court's finding that the officers were 
still, in fact, engaged in an investigation of physical violence between Thies and 
Price, and the related concern for the children who were in the car, and an 
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investigation of a potential malicious injury to property claim, is not clearly 
erroneous just because Thies thinks the investigation should have ended upon 
his and Price's denials of violence and Price's admission to throwing items out 
the window. Thies' claim to the contrary fails. 
The district court correctly concluded that there was a legitimate ongoing 
investigation at the time the drug canine was deployed and alerted on Thies' 
vehicle. Thies has failed to establish otherwise and has, therefore, failed to 
establish error in the denial of his suppression motion.2 
2 The state also submits that there was reasonable articulable suspIcIon to 
expand the purpose of the stop into a drug investigation based upon Thies' 
behavior and Officer Vogt's interpretation of that behavior in conjunction with 
Thies' criminal history (Tr., p.113, Ls.1-16). See Total Success Investments, LLC 
v. Ada County Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 696, 227 P.3d 942, 950 (Ct. App. 
2010) ("an appellate court may affirm the district court's decision if an alternative 
legal basis supports it"). Further, as noted by the district court, neither Thies nor 
Price were "going to be able to drive that car away" because neither one had a 
driver's license. (Tr., p.160, Ls.19-24.) Thus, the car would have remained on 
scene accessible to the drug dog regardless of the length of Thies' detention and 
the discovery of its contents would have inevitably been discovered following the 
canine's alert. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (Under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence 
found by improper methods if the preponderance of the evidence establishes that 
the evidence inevitably would have been found by lawful means.); Stuart v. State, 
136 Idaho 490, 496, 36 P.3d 1278, 1284 (2001) (The inevitable discovery 
doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule.). 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding Thies guilty of guilty of trafficking in 
methamphetamine, two counts of misdemeanor injury to child, possession of 
marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and concealment of evidence. 
DATED this 20th day of June 2012. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of June 2012, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
ERIC FREDERICKSEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
JML/pm 
JESSIC M. LORELLO 
I Dep · Attorney General 
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